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Abstract— SMS has become an indispensible communication 
tool used by banking, government and other agencies. 
However, the SMS is not a secure service to be used to 
transport sensitive data, as its current security mechanism 
cannot guarantee protection from modification, eavesdropping 
and man-in-the-middle attacks.  
This paper examines existing security mechanisms; 
vulnerabilities and contributions put forward by researchers in 
enhancing SMS security features. Their proposals are 
criticized with a view to finding gaps and developing a 
comprehensive solution.  
 
Index Terms—GSM, SMS Security, PKI, UMTS.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE past two decades have seen an exponential increase 
in mobile communication usage. One of the reasons for 
this has been because of the increased functionality and 
services offered. Some of these include international 
roaming capability, cost effectiveness and new services (call 
waiting, call forwarding) and the Short Message Service 
(SMS). Of all services provided by mobile telephony, the 
SMS has become extremely popular. 
The SMS is a service that provides text-messaging 
capability over a mobile network. The service is unique as it 
has a maximum message length of 160 characters, requires 
low bandwidth & provides assurance in message delivery 
within a specified period. This popularity of the SMS has 
made entities such as commercial, government take leverage 
of this platform to communicate with individuals and 
businesses. For example it is not uncommon for bank 
transaction or voting to be made via SMS, prompting 
acronyms such as m-banking and e-voting. In as much as 
SMS provides such a wide reach and convenience, is its 
platform secure? Is there assurance on the origin of the 
message or mechanism to protect data from eavesdroppers?  
This paper aims to provide an overview of SMS security 
and provide a framework for which a comprehensive 
solution may be adopted. Section II describes the GSM 
network architecture that the SMS operates on. Message 
flow within the network is also described. Section III 
describes current security mechanisms service provides 
adopted with respect to protecting the SMS from 
modification, eavesdropping and unauthorized access to 
content. Vulnerabilities associated with the mechanisms are 
also discussed. Section III describes research work done to 
enhance SMS security and finally Section IV looks at the 
 
 
different elements that will be studied in view of enhancing 
SMS security. It should however be noted that this is in its 
design phase and results will be published subsequently. 
 
II. SMS NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
This section discusses SMS traversing a GSM platform 
(figure 1.0). For delivery, messages must undergo three 
processes[1]: submission, routing and transportation 
medium.  
 Initiation of a text message is achieved through a mobile 
devices or External Short Messaging Entities (ESMEs). For 
ESMSs to deliver SMS, they must be connected to the 
mobile platforms through the SMS Interworking Mobile 
Switching Centre (SMS-IMSC)[1] . Operators offering SMS 
service usually have one or more servers known as the Short 
Messaging Service Center (SMSC). These servers are 
designed to operate in a store and forward fashion[2]. This 
is to enforce correct SMS message format and provide 
storage facility if the recipient is not available at time of 
delivery. Once the message is in SMS format, it is ready for 
routing to its destination. 
Before routing can occur, the SMSC queries the Home 
Location Register (HLR), a permanent repository that stores 
information about subscribers, about the routing information 
of the recipient. Other information the HLR stores are the 
visitor location register number, service restrictions (e.g. 
roaming limitations), subscription data[3]. Depending on the 
result of the query, the SMSC either stores the message for 
later delivery or receives information about the Mobile 
Switching Center (MSC) where the intending recipient is 
being served. The MSC handles traffic routing, 
authentication, location updates and handover procedure on 
a mobile network and as such can route messages to its 
destination[3]. With the aid of the Visitor Location Register 
(VLR), a database for temporary storage of information 
about the subscribers being serviced by an MSC, the MSC 
obtains device information if its HLR is not local. With 
knowledge of device location, the MSC forwards the 
message to the Base Station (BS) in communication with the 
device for transmission over the air medium to the device. 
 The BS on receiving the message from the MSC needs to 
forward the content to the recipient (mobile equipment) via  
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 the air. The medium comprises of the Control Channels 
(CCH) and traffic Channels (TCH)[3].  The base station 
uses the CCH to deliver SMS to mobile devices as mobile 
devices are designed to listen to this channel for SMS 
traffic. CCH is subdivided into the Random Access Channel 
(RACH) and Paging Channel (PCH). The BS uses the PCH 
to send a message with the Temporary Mobile Subscriber 
ID (TMSI) alerting the ME of an intending SMS. When the 
ME hears its TMSI, it contacts the BS via the RACH and 
confirms availability to receive SMS. The BS then instructs 
the ME to listen to a particular Standalone Dedicated 
Control Channel (SDCCH). With the SDCCH, the BS is 
able to perform encryption, authentication procedures and 
deliver the SMS message[3].  
 
A. SMS SECURITY MECHANISMS 
The resilience of SMS messages from alteration, replay 
and SMS spoofing attacks is subject to the platform the 
SMS transverses. As described the previous section, SMS 
can be transmitted via mobile networks (GSM, GPRS, 
UMTS and CDMA) and ESMEs. In this section a case study 
of security mechanisms deplored by two different network 
platforms will be examined. 
 
CASE I: Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) 
GSM incorporates security mechanisms to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity of services. These mechanisms 
are embedded within the ME and the operator network. In 
order to ensure secrecy, GSM operators deplore the A5 
algorithm. The ME initiates encryption at the request of the 
network; it uses an algorithm A8 to generate a ciphering key 
Kc with RAND gotten from the HLR. The key Kc is then 
used with the A5 algorithm to encrypt data[4]. Figure 2.0 
depicts procedure. 
The legitimacy of the user is determined by the network 
issuing a challenge to the intending user (ME). The HLR is 
assigned to send a 128bit random number (RAND), 
generated by AUC, to the ME. The ME uses an 
authentication algorithm (A3) and key Ki to compute a 
Signed Response (SRES). The network also computes this 
challenge and compares it with that of the ME. 
Authentication is deemed successful if SRES from the 
Network corresponds to that sent to the Network [4]. 
 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
In ensuring non-disclosure of data GSM utilizes the A5 
algorithm; however it has been demonstrated to be weak and 
liable to cryptanalysis as demonstrated in [5] who found the 
secret key in minutes.  Although higher variants of this 
algorithm have being developed it is still not resistant to 
attacks.  
ESMEs communicate with the SMSC is done through 
Short Message Peer to Peer protocol (SMPP)[3]. The 
SMPP protocol does not encrypt its content making SMS 
originating via ESMEs susceptible to man in the middle 
attack. Besides the weak encryption the GSM network 
utilizes, the network does not provide end-to-end security. 
This exposes plaintext messages at certain points within the 
infrastructure thereby making those areas vulnerable to 
man-in-the-middle attack.  
Replay attacks are possible with the authentication 
mechanism the GSM operates. GSM infrastructure lacks 
mutual authentication [6]. As a result there is a possibility 
where an attacker deplores an authentication request or 
response to be replayed. Impersonation and false transaction 
could be executed thereby compromising existing 
authentication mechanisms. Moreover the GSM does not 
provide non-repudiation mechanisms. This greatly 
compromises the SMS in its ability to provide information 
assurance. 
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 CASE II: Universal Mobile Telecommunication System 
(UMTS) 
UMTS security mechanism was designed to eliminate the 
security flaws of its predecessor, the GSM. The security 
mechanisms can be classified into five distinct features; 
network domain security, network access security, 
application domain security, user domain security and 
visibility and configurability of security [7, 8]. Of the above 
mentioned security features, the network access security is a 
primary component as it is tasked with providing 
confidentiality, integrity protection of signaling data and 
authentication [7]. 
Unlike its predecessor, the UMTS incorporates mutual 
authentication between Serving Network (SE) and ME. In 
order to achieve mutual authentication, authentication 
vectors consisting of Encryption Key (CK), user challenge 
(RAND), expected user response (XRES), the integrity key 
(IK) and the authentication token for network authentication 
(AUTN) are used [9].  
Authentication is initiated in the VLR and mutual 
authentication is successful when VLRs XRES matches the 
received RES. Figure 3.0 depicts the process involved in 
mutual authentication. Exchange of CK and IK to their 
entities are then permissible to perform integrity protection. 
When authentication is complete, Message Authentication 
Code (MAC) function is applied on the link with CK and IK 
derived from the authentication process to preserve 
integrity.  
 
VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS 
UMTS design allows for interoperability with the GSM 
network. Interoperability between UMTS and GSM was 
necessary for easy transition to UMTS networks[8]. 
Moreover GSM had a wider coverage, it was necessary for 
UMTS subscribers to roam in areas with GSM only 
coverage and vice-versa. But lack of mutual authentication 
in GSM means a man-in-the-middle attack could still occur 
as shown in [10].  
The failure of a mobile station to authenticate the serving 
network means that a variant of false base station attack 
could still occur. This was demonstrated in [11] where a 
redirection of traffic to a different network with weak 
encryption algorithm was possible. 
In all, vulnerabilities in underlying networks could enable 
attacks on SMS possible. Contributions on eliminating these 
vulnerabilities are examined in the following section. 
 
III. RELATED WORK 
 Several proposals have been put forward towards 
securing SMS services; contributions have being centered 
on either modifying network infrastructure or providing 
end-to-end security at the application layer. Hossain et al. in 
[12] suggested modifying the GSM infrastructure at the 
transport layer to enhance confidentiality. His proposal 
could strengthen confidentiality however the encryption 
process proposed is subject to operators’ encryption scheme 
and therefore requires their consent for implementation. 
Most researchers don’t concentrate effort at the transport 
layer due to the limitation mentioned. 
The second category of research is concentrated on is the 
application layer. It appeals to researchers and developers 
because implementation can be achieved without the service 
providers’ consent. However, providing security platforms 
at this layer is subject to the capability and capacity of the 
mobile equipment[13]. Therefore in developing security 
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 mechanisms, encryption schemes, consideration of key 
management, energy consumption and speed must be 
considered. 
Due to the limitation of mobile equipment, symmetric 
encryption techniques would be ideal as its encryption 
process is fast and uses shorter keys when compared to 
asymmetric encryption. However, key distribution is a 
problem when deploying symmetric encryption and the 
number of keys needed for communication is approximate 
to the square of number of senders [14].  Another drawback 
is its limitation to ensure confidentiality of data.  
Ratshinanga introduced a hybrid scheme by proposing the 
use of asymmetric key encryption for key distribution 
process [15]. This ensured key protection and integrity of 
SMS service. However, the computational process is too 
high due to incorporation of asymmetric encryption 
scheme in encrypting the SMS distribution and key 
agreement. Researches tend to combine asymmetric 
cryptography and symmetric cryptography to achieve fast 
processing speed and safe key agreement. The schemes 
described above can be does not incorporate authentication 
mechanisms.  
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides a 
framework of providing assurance that the parties 
communicating are authentic. It involves obtaining 
certificate and extracting public key before encryption can 
be applied. The PKI scheme is high computationally 
intensive due to large key generations; it cannot be directly 
imbedded on a mobile device [16]. Many researchers in 
adopting this framework attempt to segment the high 
computational part to a dedicated server or third party. 
Others adopt the symmetric key cryptography to reduce the 
asymmetric cryptography overhead. Table I shows different 
schemes of PKI framework. 
 
Although the PKI framework can be used to enhance 
SMS security, it is beneficial to large organizations such as 
banks or governmental usage.  This is due to the large cost 
of maintaining servers or third party license cost. The PKI 
framework is also fraught with lots of complexities such as 
Service provider approval, certificate standardization and 
will require technical support.  
 
IV. PROPOSAL FOR ENHANCING SMS SECURITY 
Providing efficient end-to-end cryptographic solution is the 
most effective method of enhancing SMS security. This 
approach provides a single point of decryption (at the 
receiving node) thus ending numerous cycles of encryption-
decryption processes currently experienced at different 
nodes of the mobile network. This approach will also reduce 
the number of attack nodes. End-to-End security can be 
applied at the application layer on the mobile equipment 
device and is software driven subject to: 
a) Processing capabilities of mobile phone. 
b) Memory capacity of the mobile phone or SIM 
card. 
c) Processing capabilities of a crypto-processor 
that is embedded in the ME. 
 
Due to the limitations of mobile phones, a lightweight 
infrastructure is proposed. The cryptographic technique 
deployed would be hybrid (both symmetric and asymmetric 
encryption). Using both modes of encryption takes 
advantage of their cryptographic strength and enhances the 
overall security of the SMS service. The infrastructure will 
incorporate 
1) Using Symmetric Encryption for encryption and 
decryption.   
2) Using asymmetric cryptography for key distribution. The 
Elliptic Curve Cryptographic (ECC) technique will be 
deployed as it is efficient and uses lesser number of keys as 
opposed to other schemes.  
3) Deploying a pair of private-public keys to each 
subscriber.  
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Figure 4.0: Proposed Solution Architecture
 
 Integrity of the message will be achieved by hashing the 
message before it is sent to the recipient. Figure 4.0 shows 
the steps taken in achieving this process. On the receiver 
end, the message is first hashed and verified to ensure the 
integrity of the message.  
The asymmetric encryption in the proposed architecture 
performs twos tasks: it ensures safe key exchange between 
the sender and the recipient, it also prevents the sender from 
denying not sending the message as the private key will be 
used sign the message. 
 
Validation of the proposed solution will be done in two 
phases: 
§ Testing different encryption techniques using a 
suitable emulator to determine suitable option for 
mobile systems. 
§ Installing developed solution on multiple mobile 
phone devices to determine their performance on 
different processing capabilities. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
SMS is one communication tool that will be used for a long 
time due its simplicity and low cost. Current security 
mechanisms cannot curb modification, replay and man-in-
the-middle attacks. End-to End security is seen as a 
permanent solution in preserving user data. Challenges that 
need addressing include providing efficient yet lightweight 
cryptographic mechanisms, reliable key management and 
distribution system. This paper highlights the challenges 
with a view to get a framework where a solution can be 
obtained.  
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